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Ill the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
CAROLINE P. JENSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
GEORGIAN CORPORATION, INCOR-
PORATED, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
CASE 
NO. 8708 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered upon a ver-
dict of the jury in favor of Georgi,an Corporation, Incor-
porated, defendant and respondent, and against Caroline 
P. Jensen, plaintiff and appeUant, in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court of Utah County. For convenience we will 
refer to the parties as plaintiff and defendant in this brief. 
We deem the issues drawn by the pleadings of the parties 
in this case of such importance as to warrant a brief analy-
sis at the outset. 
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In her Complain.t, as amended, the plaintiff alleges that 
she received serious permanent injuries as a result of trip-
ping over a steel sewer plug which protruded above the 
surface of the concrete floor in the basement lanndry pro-
vided for her as an apartment house tenant of the defend-
ant. Plaintiff further alleges that the negligence of the 
defendant consisted in its allowing "a steel plug . . . to 
protrude and project upwards from the surface of the floor 
several inches, and so located as to create a dangerous and 
unsafe condition for plaintiff's laundry work . . ." (R. 
4-5). These allegations the defendant denied (R. 7). Plain-
tiff further alleges that the dangerous and unsafe condi-
tion existed for more than two years prior to the plaintiff's 
injury, during which time "defendant had knowledge and 
had been warned thereof" by tenants "that same was ex-
posing said tenants to injury;" but that defendant "with 
reckless disregard for plaintiff's safety, failed, neglected 
and refused to remove said steel plug from said floor," thus 
proximately causing plaintiff's injury (R. 11). This also 
was denied by the defendant (R. 13). In its Amended 
Answer, defendant pleaded affirmatively plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence and assumption of risk (R. 7 and 9). 
The issues arising from these allegations of negligence 
by plaintiff and from their denial by defendant are as fol-
lows: 
1. Was it negligence for the defendant to allow the 
sewer plug to protrude above the surface of the concrete 
floor in the laundry area provided for plaintiff in which to 
do her laundry work? 
2. Did the plu~'s protrud~ng above the surface of the 
basement floor create a dangerous rondition? 
3. Did the defendant have knowledge of this danger-
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ous condition for more than two years prior to the time of 
plaintiff's injury? 
4. Was defendant warned of the dangerous condi-
tion and of the fact that its tenants were being exposed to 
injury? 
5. Did the defendant fail and refuse to heed these 
warnings and remedy the dangerous condition before the 
plaintiff received her permanent injuries? 
At the trial the plaintiff adduced evidence in support 
of tha foregoing allegations of her Complaint. Plaintiff 
sought at the trial to have her theory of the defendant's 
liability presented to the jury in her Requests for Instruc-
tions Nos. 3, 5, 8, 11, and 12 (R. 77, 79, 81, 85, and 86), 
which requests the court refused to give, and to which re-
fusals the plaintiff excepted. 
Over plaintiff's objections as to its materiality, the 
court admitted in evidence a portion of the Provo City 
Plumbing Code, and also expert testimony that defendant 
had complied with that· code in the installation of the sewer 
plug in the basement in question. The court gave the jury 
Instruction No. 15, which quoted the said Provo City 
Plumbing Code without any comment whatsoever, taking 
same from defendant's Requested Instruction No. 12 (R. 
29 and 66) , to which instruction pl,aintiff excepted. The 
court admitted, over the objection of the plaintiff on the 
ground that it was immaterial and improper opinion evi-
dence, testimony of expert witnesses that the sewer plug 
was properly located in accordance with the said sanitary 
code, although the said expert witnesses also testified that 
the installation and location of the plug had nothing to do 
with safety. All of the foregoing matters were called to 
the attention of the court in plaintiff's Motion for New 
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Trial, which motion was du1y argued, and denied by the 
court (R. 94, 95, 96 and 100). From the judgment entered 
upon the verdict and from the court's Order Denying Plain-
tiff's Motion for New Trial this appeal is taken. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In support of her Complaint as amended, plaintiff 
proved the following facts at the trial: 
Plaintiff is an elderly woman of the age of 67 years, 
has a family of four children, all of full legal age, and has 
been a tenant in Apartment No. 43 in defendant's Geor-
gian Apartments in Provo, Utah, since 1952 (Tr. 179-180). 
During that period she kept house in that apartment for 
herself and two members of her family Jessie Jensen and 
Bobby Jensen. She rented the apartment from one Carl 
B. Clegg, defendant's manager, and the laundry area in the 
basement of the south wing of the apartments was assigned 
to her for her use in doing her laundry in common with 
other tenants of defendant's apartments (Tr. 181-183). 
Each week during her tenancy, plaintiff, with the help of 
her children Jessie and Bobby, did her laundry work in this 
basement laundry area (Tr. 182). The general layout of 
this basement laundry is shown by the plat, Exhibit P-1 
(R. 90). The area is a little over 60 feet from east wall 
to west wall, and a little more than 20 feet from north wall 
to south wall. The walls and floor are of concrete, and 
the partitions form three rooms. Laundry sinks are lo-
cated in the east room and the west room, and there is a 
washer located near the sink in each of the two rooms. 
The middle room is used exclusively for drying clothes. 
Along the walls of the rooms, principally along the north 
wall, lockers ·are provided for the use of the tenants. In 
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each of the three rooms lines for hanging clothes have been 
provided. A stairway leads into this area from the east 
end, and this was the entrance regularly used by plaintiff 
to enter and leave the area. Plaintiff did her washing in 
the east room but had always bad access to the facilities 
in all three of the rooms each week when she did her laun-
dry (Tr. 182-184). 
In the floor of the west room, about four and one-half 
feet south of the front of the north locker and about five 
and one-half feet west of the east locker, a metal sewer 
plug was located which served as a clean-out for the sewer 
line which ran beneath the surface of the floor. The base 
of the sewer plug is about four inches in diameter and is 
level with the floor, but the plug had a metal wrench shoul-
der about one and one-fourth inches square, projecting 
and protruding upwards to about one inch above the sur-
face of the concrete floor, as shown by Exhibits P-2 and 
2A (R. 90). This sewer plug thus protruding above the 
surface of the floor lay directly in the path which tenants, 
entering the west room from the drying room, were obliged 
to move along in order to hang clothes on the west lines 
in the southwest corner of the west room (Tr. 93-94). The 
metal shoulder of the sewer plug, located as it was, and 
protruding above the smooth surface of the floor, created 
a hazardous and dangerous situation for defendant's ten-
ants using the laundry area almost from the beginning of 
its occupancy. The witness, Clegg, manager or defend-
ant's apartments from 1951 to 1954, and his assistant, both 
tripped over the plug in the early part of this period. Clegg, 
while on a tour of inspection in this very laundry area with 
"Nick," one of defendant's principal officers and its Presi-
dent (Tr. 234), pointed the sewer plug out to him and said, 
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"This is something that ought to be taken care of or some-
body's going to fall and hurt themselves." Also, Clegg 
thereafter on "quite a few inspections" pointed out the 
serwer plug to "Nick" and told him it should be taken care 
of (Tr. 172 and 173). Defendant's tenants Backman and 
Tanner, as well as one J.ex and Wiserniller, doing work in 
the laundry area, were either seen to trip over the sewer 
plug or advised Clegg that they had so tripped (Tr. 163-
170). In the spring of 1953, Vera Backman, one of de-
fendant's tenants, tripped over the sewer plug and so ad-
vised Clegg, the defendant's manageT (Tr. 73-74). But 
nothing was ever done by the defendant about removing 
the plug, up to the time Clegg left in February of 1954 (Tr. 
173). The witness Planty was a tenant in the defendant's 
apartments from 1951 until 1955, and did her laundry work 
in this same area. She frequently observed both manager 
Clegg 1and manager Price, after Clegg left, in the west room 
of the laundry in the vicinity of the sewer plug in ques-
tion (Tr. 23-24). She testified that she tripped over the 
plug herself and saw others trip over it (Tr. 24-25), and 
that defendant's then assistant manager, Price, saw her 
do so on one occasion, which was in about the year 1953. 
She believed that the sewer plug was dangerous and ad-
vised manager Clegg of her tripping (Tr. 26). The wit-
ness Miller, another tenant of defendant's apartments from 
August 1954, to August, 1955, testified that on occasion 
she saw defendant's manager down in the laundry area in 
the west room, and that she herself had tripped over the 
plug several times during that year (Tr. 39, 41, 42), and 
that nothing had been done to remove it (Tr. 46). The 
witness Bobby Jensen tripped over this sewer plug about 
three months before plaintiff, his mother, was injured on 
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it (Tr. 50, 51, and 52). He advised defendant's manager, 
Price, "that plug ought to be changed; somebody's going 
to trip and hurt themselves," burt nothing was done to rem-
edy the situation. About a year and a half before her 
mother was injured, the witness Jessie Jensen tripped over 
this sewer plug while coming from the lines in the west 
room where she had hung up clothes. She so advi·sed de-
fendant's manager, Price, telling him, "You ought to have 
that plug fixed," but no change in the plug was thereafter 
made (Tr. 94-95). 
Plaintiff had tripped over this same sewer plug "quite 
a while before" her serious injury on April 6, 1956, and had 
advised defendant's manager, Price, of it; but northing was 
ever done to remedy the condition of the protruding plug 
(Tr. 189-190). The witness Price, defendant's manager, 
recalled that Bobby Jensen advised him about two weeks 
after Clegg left, which was in the spring of 1954, that the 
sewer plug should be changed, "that he thought it was dan-
gerous," and that he, Price, had agreed with him about the 
danger (Tr. 215-216). From these facts the conclusion is 
warranted that the protruding sewer plug in the laundry 
area provided by defendant for the use of plaintiff and its 
other tenants was a dangerous hazard from the time the 
apartment house was opened for tenants in 1951; that the 
defendant's managers and principal officer knew full well 
of same; and that nothing was done a:bout the plug until 
after plaintiff had sustained her serious and permanent in-
juries on April 6, 1956, when the defendant caused the said 
plug to be removed and a new sewer plug, level with the 
surface of the surrounding concrete floor, to be installed 
(Tr. 216). 
On the evening of April 6, 1956, while plaintiff was us-
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ing the west room of the laundry area, which she had done 
all during her tenancy (Tr. 182) without objection of de-
fendant's managers, (Tr. 229) she tripped and fell over 
the protruding plug (Tr. 184-185). Because of an old ar-
thritic fusion condition of a vertebrae of her spine (Tr. 144-
145) plaintiff was proceding carefully at the time she 
tripped over the plug (Tr. 187-188). In the fall plaintiff 
broke her right hip bone and suffered other injuries (Tr. 
190-191). Dr. Kezerian diagnosed the injury as an "intra-
capsular fracture of the right hip" (Tr. 128), performed 
a surgery called "replacement prosthesis" (Tr. 134) in 
which a metal socket called "vitalliwn" replaces the hip 
socket bone (Tr. 136), and characterized the damage as 
permanent, stating that, "she will always limp" (Tr. 138). 
The doctor gives his prognisis and describes plaintiff's con-
dition as of April 9, 1957, stating at the end thereof that, 
"I believe it is permanent" (Tr. 139, 140, and 141). 
The sewer plug was allowed to remain protruding above 
the surface of the west basement room floor by defend-
ant's managers and officers until a few days after plain-
tiff had suffered her serious and permanent injuries, when 
defendant's m'anager, Price, changed it and put an inverted 
type of sewer plug in its place (Tr. 216 and 230). 
By the testimony of two witnesses, Woods (Tr. 254-
282) and Hodson (Tr. 285-294), the defendant sought to 
defend on the grounds that the sewer plug in question was 
installed in the Georgian Apartments in accordance with 
the Provo City Plumbing Code. Over plaintiff's objec-
tion on grounds of materiality, the court allowed Woods 
to testify concerning the plumbing code requirements (Tr. 
261). A portion of the plumbing code of Provo was re-
ceived in evidence over the objection by the plaintiff that 
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it was immaterial and irrelevant 1Jo the issues (Tr. 262). 
A further objection by plaintiff to the questions put to 
Woods about the proper location of the sewer plug rela-
tive to the requirements of the plumbing code on the 
grounds that it was immaterial was overruled by the court 
(Tr. 263-2,65). Woods admitted that his testimony per-
tained to the location of the pipelines and sewer plug under 
the sanitary plumbing code (Tr. 271-272). On cross-ex-
amination when Woods was asked if there was anything 
in this code requiring that the plug be put in with a metal 
shoulder protruding above the surface of the floor, the 
court sustained defendant's objection thereto that it was 
not proper cross-examination (Tr. 273-274). Woods fur-
ther testified that the location of the plug had been deter-
mined solely by considerations of sanitation, that safety 
had no bearing on that installation, and that the code does 
not require the protrusion of the metal shoulder above the 
stuface of the traveled portion of the floor (Tr. 279-280). 
Over plaintiff's objection that it was immaterial, Hodson 
was permitted to testify as to the location of the plug with 
regard to the code (Tr. 289). However, Hodson also tes-
tified that the code was for sanitary purposes only; that 
it does not require the plug to protrude above the surface 
of the floor; and that he never co!l1Sidered the safety fac-
tor at all in connection with his testimony (Tr. 294). 
Upon these facts as they appear in the record, it is plain-
tiff's position that the court committed prejudici-al error 
(1) in admitting the testimony offered by defendant that 
the sewer plug was properly located on the basement floor, 
and in further admitting in evidence a portion of the Provo 
City Sanitary Plumbing Code, because the Code bad no 
relevance to the issue of safety raised by the pleadings, 
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and applied only to sanitary considerations; (2) by giving 
Instruction No. 15, which contained only the portion of the 
said Provo City Sanitary Plumbing Code admitted in evi-
dence and quoted ve~batim in said instruction, without any 
comment by the court as to its possible application to the 
facts of the case or any comment whatsoever; and (3) by 
refusing to give plaintiff's Requested Instructions num-
bered 3, 5, 8, 11, and 12, which embodied her theory of de-
fendant's liability under the issues raised by the pleadings 
and the evidence. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
BY ADMITTING DEFENDANT'S EXPERT TESTIMO-
NY THAT THE SEWER PLUG IN QUESTION WAS IN-
STALLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF 
THE PROVO CITY SANITARY CODE UNRELATED 
TO SAFETY; ALSO BY ADMITTING TilE SAID CODE 
PROVISIONS IN EVIDENCE; AND BY GIVING THE 
JURY INSTRUCTION NUMBER 15, SE'ITING OUT 
SAME WITHOUT COMMENT. 
POINT II 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
BY REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 3, 5, 8, 11, AND 12, THUS 
DENYING PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO HAVE HER 
THEORY OF DEFENDANT'S LIABILITY UNDER THE 
FACTS OF THliS CASE PRESENTED TO THE JURY. 
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THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
BY ADMITTING DEFENDANT'S EXPERT TESTIMO-
NY THAT THE SEWER PLUG IN QUESTION WAS IN-
STALLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF 
THE PROVO CITY SANITARY CODE UNRELATED 
TO SAFETY; ALSO BY ADMITTING THE SAID CODE 
PROVISIONS IN EVIDENCE; AND BY GIVING THE 
JURY INSTRUCTION NUMBER 15, SETTING OUT 
SAME WITHOUT COMMENT. 
Plaintiff made no claim in her pleadings, or at the trial, 
that the negligence of the defendant consisted in the viola-
tion of an ordinance or statute. Nor in its pleadings did 
the defendant seek to defend on the theory that it had 
complied with an ordinance or statute. At the trial, how-
ever, defendant did offer evidence which was intended to 
show that it was free from negligence because the sewer 
plug in question had been located in accordance with a sani-
tary code plumbing ordinance of Provo City. The said 
plumbing code was ,and is wholly unrelated to the inte,re,st 
of plaintiff which was violated, or to any claim thalt she 
made about the negligence of defendant. Plaintiff's claim 
is that defendant allowed the metal wrench shoulder in 
question to protrude above the surface of the basement 
floor over which the plaintiff, and the other tenants, had 
to pass in order to do their laundry work, and that tills 
condition was -dangerous and a hazard to their safety, all 
of which was well known to the defendant for a period of 
years, and that no remedial action was taken by it. De-
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12 
spite the fact that the plaintiff's claim was overwhelmingly 
supported by her evidence, as well as that of the defend-
ant, the court, over her objection on grounds of immateri-
ality and that it was outside the issues raised by the plead-
ings, allowed defendant to give evidence that the sewer plug 
in question was placed on the basement floor in accordance 
with a sanitary plwn:bing code provision, and admitted the 
code in evidence. Furthermore, the court subsequently 
gave Instruction No. 15, setting out the sanitary code pro-
vision in question without any comment whatsoever about 
its possible connection with plaintiff's charge of negligence 
against defendant. It is plaintiff's position that the court 
in so doing committed error which was misleading to the 
jury and highly prejudicial to the plaintiff. 
The said Provo City Plumbing Code provisions as 
quoted from the court's Instruction No. 15, are as follows: 
"You axe instructed that the Plumbing Code of 
Provo City, Utah, provides: 
'Cleanouts shall not be less in size than the pipe 
served, up to four (4) inch pipe. Cleanouts for screw 
pipe and fittings shall be heavy cast brass plugs with 
a solid wrench shoulder, not less than one (1) inch 
thick and one (1) inch high . . . 
'Cleanouts shall be installed in the building drain-
age system at all right angle or ninety (90) degree 
changes in direction and at the end of all horizontal 
lines of soil, waste and drain pipes . . . and pro-
vided further, that, the location and number of clean-
outs required in each installation of soil, waste and 
vent pipes shall,be subject to rthe approval of the plumb-
ing inspector.' '' 
Defendant's witnesses, Woods and Hlodson, both ad-
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mitted on cross-examination that the quoted code did not 
require that the metal wrench shoulder of said sewer plug 
protrude above the surface of the well-traveled basement 
floor, and in fact both witnesses admitted that the location 
of the plug had been determined solely by considerations 
of sanitaJtion, and that their testimony did not at all go to 
the safety factor in allowing the sewer plug to so exist. 
Obviously, the plumbing c<Xle provisions go only to the pro-
tection of interests involved in sanitation ·and health; on 
the other hand, ·that interest of plaintiff which was violated 
was unrelated to the code on the pleadings and the record, 
the interest violated being that of physical security from 
violent injury, and not her interest to be free from disease 
caused 'by WlSanitary conditions. 
On what theory the court admitted the Provo City 
Plumbing Code and evidence pertinent thereto is not dis-
closed by the record. Certainly the defendant made no 
claim that the plaintiff's claimed contributory negligence 
was her violation of the provisions of the said plumbing 
code. Nor did the plaintiff claim that defendant had vi~ 
lated the same. Had there been such claim, the applicable 
principle of law in such cases is stated as follows in 38 
American Jurisprudence, Section 158, at Page 827 and fol-
lowing: 
"Comprehensively stalted, the rule is that where 
a statute or municipal ordinance imposes upon any 
person a specific duty for the protection or benefit of 
others, if he neglects to perfonn that duty, he is liable 
to those for whose protection or benefit it was im-
posed for any injuries of the character which the stat-
ute or ordinance was designed to prevent, and which 
were proximately produced by such neglect, provided, 
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according to the rule prevailing in some, but not all, 
jurisdictions, the plaintiff is free from contributocy 
negligence." 
And see to the same effect: Prosser on Torts, Section 
39, Page 264; Restatement of the Law, Torts, Volume! 2, 
Section 286, Page 752; and Utah Law Review, Volume 3, 
Page 397. See also Mechler vs. McMahon, 239 N. W. 605, 
where it was said by the court at Page 607: 
"We now state the rule to be that, in the absence 
of valid excuse or justification, the vloiation by the 
injured person of a statute or ordinance enacted for 
the benefit of the other party is conclusive evidence 
of contributory negligence, if such violation proxi-
mately contributes to the injury. The rule in this state 
has always been that the unjustified violation by the 
defendant of a statute or ordinance enacted for the 
benefit of the injured party is negligence per se, if it 
proximately results in injury. 
"If the statute or ordinance was not enacted for 
the benefit of the party invoking it, the general rule 
is that irt is wholly immaterial, although the acts which 
constituted violation may be admissible on the ques-
tion of common law negligence. In other words, the 
general rule is that the violation of such statute or 
ordinance is not even a circumstance to be considered 
on the question of negligence or contributory negli-
gence. Whether such statute or ordinance was en-
acted for the benefit of a particular person is a ques-
tion of law." 
The defendant seems to imply that the rule a:bove 
stated applied to it conversely, i.e., that because the sewer 
plug in question had been installed and located in its base-
ment laundry area floor, defendant was thereby cleared of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
any negligence whatsoever. Plaintiff maintains, however, 
that the principle could not be applied conversely thus for 
the reason that the ordinance in question was not enacted 
for the benefit of the defendant who invoked it, nor to 
protect that interest of the plaintiff which was violated, 
and that same was not designed to prevent the injuries 
she received as a result of the unsafe condition of the pro-
truding sewer plug. In fact, the said plumbing code pro-
visiqns can have no relevance to the claim of negligence 
with which plaintiff charged the defendant: namely, that 
the sewer plug being allowed to protrude above the sur-
face of the floor was a ha2lard to her safety. 
Defendant seems to justify the admission of the plumb-
ing code provisions and evidence pertaining thereto, by 
contending that the doctrine of "what the law specifically 
authorizes cannot be wrongful." Here again the defend-
ant's implication is--even though the plaintiff made no 
claim that the plumbing code provisions had been violated 
by defendant-that the location and installation of the 
sewer plug in accordance with that ordinance having as 
its purpose sanitary matters, such as the preservation of 
health, relieved defendant of any responsibility on its part 
to keep the area provided for plaintiff as an incident of her-
tenancy free from safety hazards. Most courts apply this 
doctrine very narrowly and against the contention of de-
fendant . 
The case of McGettigan vs. New York C. R. Co., 268 
N. Y. 66, 196 N. E. 745, 99 A.L.R. 283 (1935) involved an 
action for damages sustained by plaintiff when the vehicle 
in which she was riding struck the concrete base of a sig-
nal placed by the defendant in the center of a highway ad-
jacent to its railroad tracks. Plaintiff recovered in the 
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lower court, and on appeal the defendant urged a reversal 
of the judgment on the ground that the object struck had 
been authorized and installed by law, and that therefore 
there could be no civil responsibility for damages in the 
action. The legal requirement pursuant to which the sig-
nal was placed came from an order o the Public Service 
Commission for its installation. It was undisputed that 
defendant was required to comply with such an order. The 
principle point relied upon by the defendant was that it 
owed no duty to the plaintiff beyond that defined by the 
order of the Public Service Commission. The Appellate 
Court ooncluded that the matter was properly submitted 
to the jury, and at page 286 of A.L.R. report the following 
was said: 
"The problem, it may be observed again, is to settle 
by construction the limits of the orders of the Public 
Service Commission. The doctrine that what the law 
specifically sanctions cannot itself be wrongful has 
been narrowly applied in this court. 'We need not 
discuss the cases, or consider how broadly the doctrine 
should be permitted to operate, since one condition or 
limitation has been firmly grafted upon it, which raises 
the final and ultimate question in the case before us. 
That limitation is that the authority which will thus 
shelter an actual nuisance must be express, or a clear 
and unquestionaJble implication from powers conferred, 
should be certain and unambiguous and such as to 
show that the legislature must have contemplated 
the doing of the very act in question.' Hill vs. Mayor, 
etc., of City of New York, 139 N. Y. 495, 501, 502, 34 
N. E. 1090, 1092. See 1 Street on the Foundation of 
Legal Liability, pp. 41-45. 
"Authority to defendant to place the signal appa-
ratus in the center of the highway was conferred in 
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general terms of mere permission. There was no im-
perative command that the structure if so located was 
to be maintained with the specific equipment and north-
ing more. Indeed, there is no negative word in either 
order of the Public Service Commission. Defendant 
is not here held liable merely because it made an un-
wise choice between the alternatives afforded by the 
orders. As we read .them, a larger discretion was 
thereby left to defendant, and the presumption is that 
this discretion was intended to be exercised in con-
formity with private rights. (citing cases) 
We can find no room for the implication that defend-
ant was to be immune although (as the jury could 
have found) it kept a dangerous thing in the highway 
after knowledge of the danger." 
The evidence in the case at bar elearly esta!blishes the 
protruding wrench shoulder to be a nuisance. There is no 
express or implied authority in the Plumbing Code invoked 
by defendant which will sanction the existence of such a 
nuisance. The annotation in 99 A.L.R. 287, cites cases 
which support plaintiff's contention that aside from the 
mandate of law as embodied in an ordinance, a person is 
still required to exercise such rights in conformity with 
private rights and, therefore, is nort excused from the re-
sponsibility that the law of negligence places upon him. 
In the present case, there is no reason in logic or jus-
tice which would jusrtify admitting in evidence either the 
Provo City Sanitary Plumbing Code, or the testimony of 
defendant that the construction of the sewer and drains 
and the clean-out plug in question was performed in ac-
cordance with that code, since the same was not intended 
to have any application to the safety of tenants using the 
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said area for laundry purposes as an incident of their ten-
ancy. 
It is plaintiff's position that the court's Instruction 
No. 15, setting forth the bare provisions of said sanitary 
plumbing code, with neither comment nor explanation as 
to its possible application to the evidence in the case, was 
misleading to the jury and highly prejudicial to plaintiff. 
This instruction was taken verbatim from defendant's Re-
quest No. 12 as amended, but the court struck therefrom 
the following comment about the code quoted: 
"If you find by the preponderance of the evidence 
in this case that the clean-out plug of which the plain-
tiff complains was installed in compliance with this 
provision of the Provo City Plumbing Code then you 
may not find that defendant was guilty of any negli-
gence in the installation, use, or maintenance there-
of, and in that event your verdict should be for the 
defendant and against the plaintiff, no cause of ac-
tion." (R. 66). 
Apparently the court regarded the comment stricken 
as improper, but made no comment whatsoever as to what 
application the quoted code might have to the evidence 
in this case. This left the jury free to speculate on the im-
material evidence admitted over plaintiff's objection and 
to conclude that defendant was not guilty of negligence be-
cause the se,wer plug in question was installed as required 
by the quoted code, which in any case clearly had nothing 
to do with safety, but was enacted for sanitary purposes 
alone. 
Common experience with jurors leads us rt:o the con-
clusion that to quote a law in an instruction without com-
ment or explanation as to its relevance to the facts in evi-
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dence to be considered by the jury leaves its members free 
to speculate about its possible meaning, and is misleading 
and highly prejudicial to the party against whom it is in-
voked. 
Meado;rs vs. Huffman, 127 P2d 806 (1942), was a case 
in which the plaintiff had been injured by falling into an 
uncovered opening in a street in the City of Oklahoma 
City. Plaintiff offered an ordinance of that city pertain-
ing to unguarded openings adjacent to a street, sidewalk 
or alley, claiming that defendant had violated same and 
was guilty of negligence per se. The ordinance was re-
ceived in evidence and the court instructed the jury that 
its violation constituted negligence per se, and plaintiff 
recovered. On appeal the question oncerned rthe materi-
ality of the ordinance in question and whether the court's 
instruction thereon was error. The court held that "the 
ordinance, . . . is inapplicable, and was not admis-
sible in evidence for any purpose" on the ground that it 
did not apply to the area in question and that the court's 
instruction thereon was prejudicial error. On the ques-
tion of the prejudicial effect of admitting such an ordinance 
and instructing thereon, the court had the fjollowing to say 
at page 808 of Pacific Reporter: 
"Considering these things together the instruction, 
if not tantamount to directing a verdict for the plain-
tiff, was at least strongly suggestive and persuasive of 
such action by the jury. If the minds of the jury were 
influenced by the ordinance and the instruction and 
believed that the defendant was negligent as a matter 
of law, they could not at the same time have given 
proper consideration to the defense of the defendant 
including that of contributory negligence." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
The judgment of the lower court was reversed, largely 
upon the court's opinion a:bout the extremely prejudicial 
effect of admitting in evidence and instructing the jury 
upon the ordinance in question, and the strongly persuasive 
effect that the bare citation of such enactments of law 
have upon juries. 
POINT II 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
BY REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 3, 5, 8, 11, AND 12, THUS 
DENYING PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO HAVE HER 
THEORY OF DEFENDANT'S LIABILITY UNDER THE 
FACTS OF TH.[S CASE PRESENTED TO THE JURY. 
Defendant's denial of plaintiff's allegations in her Com-
plaint, as amended, that the sewer plug in question, which 
protruded and projected upwards from the surface of the 
floor, was so located as to create a dangerous and unsafe 
condition which existed for more than two years prior to 
plaintiff's injury, during which time defendant had been 
warned that the same was exposing ~the tenants to injury, 
but that defendant "with reckless disregard for plaintiff's 
safety, failed, neglected and refused to remove said steel 
plug from said floor," clearly created the principle issue 
upon which the parties went to trial. The evidence ad-
duced by plaintiff overwhelmingly supports her claim, as 
indicated by the proven facts on the record. There can 
be no question but that the defendant landlord could not, 
charged as it was by this array of uncontradicted evidence 
about the dange~rous condition created by this protruding 
sewer plug, defeat plaintiff's action to recover for her seri-
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ous and permanent injuries by the plea of contributory neg-
ligence and assumption of risk . The cases so holding are 
collected in a recent annotation in 25 A.L.R. 2d 364, et seq. 
A New Jersey case is there cited which seems to reflect 
the situation obtaining in the case at bar. At page 403 of 
the annotation it is stated as follows: 
"Since there was evidence that the defendant land-
lord had actual notice that nails were projecting from 
the steps of a common stairway in his tenement house 
long before the plaintiff, a tenant, was injured when 
her skirt caught on the protruding nails, causing her 
to fall, it was held in Kramer vs. Lehrhoff (1923) 99 
N.J.L. 47, 122 A 540, that the plaintiff could not be 
charged wirth assumption of risk or contributory neg-
ligence in using the stairs, the court saying that the 
landlord was not entitled to assume a laissez faire at-
titude, relying in perfect security upon the contribu-
tory risk his tenants necessarily incurred in the use 
of the leased premises, and that the tenant was not 
obliged, rather than use the stairs and assume the risk, 
to confine herself to her apartment 'in comforting medi-
tation upon the benignant solicitude of the landlord.' " 
To the same effect see: Burt vs. Baker (1937) 22 Cal 
App. 2d 501, 71 P2d 335; Farrell vs. Weisman, (1932) 108 
N.J.L. 458, 158 A. 826; Palmer vs. Dearing (1883) 93 N. 
Y. 7; Finch vs. Willmott (1930) 107 Cal App 662, 290 P 
660; Lebovies vs. Howie, 307 Mkh. 306, 11 N. W. 2d 906, 
908; Cunningham vs. Silverstein (Pa.) 40 Lack. Jur. 42, 46; 
Mundy vs. Stiles (Tex. Civ. App.) 257 S. W. 2d 750; and 
see also 25 A.L.R. 2d 444, at page 447, where it is said: 
"The same circumstances relied upon to charge 
the landlord with constructive notice of the defective 
condition will also ordinarily tend to establish notice 
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on the part of the plaintiff, and so reflect upon the is-
sues of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. 
However, while it is generally held that such notice 
is a relevant circumstance in determining whether the 
mode of use by the plaintiff showed a proper consid-
eration for his own safety, the courts have usually held 
that the mere fact of continued use will not be enough 
to establish, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent or had assumed the risk." 
No complaint is made by plaintiff that the court in-
structed the jury in Instructions Nos. 4, 10, 17, 20, 24, 26, 
and 28, embodying defendant's theory of the case , largely 
in relation to its pleas of contributory negligence and as-
sumption of risk on the part of plaintiff. But plaintiff does 
complain that it was prejudicial error for the court to re-
fuse to instruct the jury in her Requested Instructions num-
bered 3, 5, 8, 11, and 12, embodying her theory of the de-
fendant' s liability on the pleadings and facts adduced in 
support thereof at the trial. 
Briefly summarized, plaintiff's requested instructions 
which the court refused to give were as follows: 
Request No. 3 asks the court to instruct that defend-
ant corporation could act only through its officers and em-
ployees, that the defendant's apartments were being opel\ 
ated by its managers with whose acts it would be charged, 
that Clegg and Price were such managers from the fall of 
1951 to the time of plaintiff's injury, and had been given 
notice of the hazard of the protruding floor plug while they 
were acting within the scope of their authority. This in-
struction was clearly proper on the evidence, since both 
Clegg and Price admitted that they were defendant's man-
agers during the period mentioned, and that notice of the 
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hazardous condition of the floor plug had been given to 
them by tenants, including plaintiff. 
Request No. 5 goes to the question of plaintiff's choice 
of going into the dangerous situation in the laundry area, 
about which she had knowledge, in order to accomplish 
the purpose for which defendant had provided her with the 
laundry area. It has to do with the question of whether 
or not plaintiff assumed an unreasonable risk in going into 
the laundry area to do her laundry when, despite the danger-
ous situation existing there, and its being well known to 
defendant, no other place was supplied her in which to do 
her laundry. 
Request No.8 gives the jury the facts, which are over-
whelmingly supported by the evidence, aJbout the existence 
of the protruding sewer plug in the laundry area, about 
plaintiff being obliged to pass same when doing her laun-
dry work, about defendant failing to supply plaintiff 'allY 
other place to do her laundry work, about her continuing 
to do such work in the area knowing of the existence of 
the protruding sewer plug, thus exposing herself to the risk 
of bodily harm, and that she was not guilty of contributory 
negligence, unless her going into the area to do her laun-
dry was assuming an unreasonable risk. 
Request No. 11 asks the court to instruct the jury as 
to the meaning of "reckless disregard for the safety of an-
other." We believe that the instruction is proper upon the 
pleadings, the evidence and the law in this case. It states 
that the defendant knew through its managers, and indeed 
through its President and one of its principal owneTs, dur-
ing the period of 1952 to 1956, when plaintiff was injured, 
that the condition created by the sewer plug was hazard-
ous, that tenants were tripping frequently during all of 
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said period, and that defendant failed to do anything about 
it until after plaintiff was rendered a cripple for life by 
tripping and falling over it. Under these facts, it is for the 
jury to say whether or not the conduct of the defendant 
in thus failing to prevent injury to its tenant was in reck-
less disregard of the safety of another. 
Request No. 12 presents the facts which are overwhel-
mingly supported by the evidence on these issues raised by 
the pleadings and, as does these other instructions the court 
refused to give, embodies plaintiff's theory of defendant's 
liability under the law and the facts in this case. 
We call attention to the fact, which is alleged in the 
Complaint and admitted by defendant's Answer, that the 
plaintiff, at the time of her injury, was doing her washing 
in the laundry area of defendant's apartment house, where 
she had a right to be because defendant provided same for 
such use. Plaintiff had a clear right to exercise the privi-
lege afforded her by defendant to do her washing in the 
laundry area, which was the only place provided for her 
to exercise that right. In this situation the plaintiff was 
subjected to danger by the defendant's negligently allowing 
the plug to remain in the floor where she had to pass while 
doing her washing. In such a situation the Restatement 
of Law, Tor1s, Volume 2, Section 473, at page 1243, states 
the rule of law applicable as follows: 
"If the defendant's negligence has made the plain-
tiff's exercise of a right or privilege impossible unless 
he knowingly exposes himself to a risk of bodily harm, 
the plaintiff is not guilty of contributory negligence in 
so doing unless the risk is unreasonable." 
It is submitted that the plaintiff, who had a right tD 
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be where she was to do her laundry work, cannot be de-
prived of her right to recover the damages she sustained 
on the defendant's plea of contributory negligence and as-
sumption of risk, principally because the risk she took and 
had taken for some years prior to the occurrence of this 
serious accident, was not an unreasonable ooe. 
Furthermore, plaintiff claimed in her Amended Com-
plaint, and the claim is preponderatingly supported by the 
evidence, that defendant knowingly allowed this danger-
ous condition of the sewer plug to exist for such a long 
period of time that the action in so doing constituted reck-
less disregard for the rights of the plaintiff. The law sup-
porting plaintiff's position in this regard is stated in the 
Restatement of the Law, Torts, Volume 2, Section 482, at 
page 1261-2, as follows: 
"(1) Ex:cept as stated in sub-division (2), a plain-
tiff's contributory negligence does not bar recovery 
for harm caused by the defendant's reckless disre-
gard of the plaintiff's safety. 
"(2).A plaintiff is barred from recovery for harm 
caused by the defendant's reckless disregard foc the 
plaintiff's safety if, knowing the defendant's reckless 
misconduct and the danger involved to him therein, the 
plaintiff recklessly exposes himself thereto." 
The ·comment following this rule refers to a defini-
tion of reckless misconduct as defined in Section 500, which 
follows at page 1293: 
"The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of 
the safety of another if he illltentionally does ·an act 
or fails to do an act whioh it is his duty to the orther 
to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which 
would lead a reasonable man to realize that the ac-
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tor's conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk 
of bodily harm to the other but also involves a high 
degree of probability that substantial harm will result 
to him." 
Again, we call attention to the fact that the defend-
ant knew of the dangerous situation created in the laun-
dry area by the plug, and had been repeatedly warned that 
someone would be hurt unless it was remedied. Despi~ 
this fact, the defendant failed 'and neglected to do anything 
about the danger, until the serious accident which has 
made the plaintiff an invalid for life occurred. We submit 
that under these facts, and under the law above referred 
to, the defendant was guilty, not only of negligence, but 
of a reckless disregard for the safety of its tenants, includ-
ing plaintiff, who had a right to use the laundry area. In 
any event the law accords the plaintiff the right to have 
this, her theory of defendant's liability, submitted to the 
jury. Under such circumstances, our position is that de-
fendant cannot hide behind the rule of contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk and oblige the plaintiff "to 
confine herself to her apartment 'in comforting meditation 
upon the benignant solicitude of the landlord,'" as was 
said by the court in the New Jersey case (supra). 
The above mentioned requested instructions embodied 
the plaintiff's theory of defendant's liability under the facts 
and the law obove mentioned. The refusal of the court 
to grant plaintiff's said requests was made one of the prin-
cipal grounds of her Motion for New Trial (R. 94-95, 1, d, 
e, f, and g), but the court refused to grant the motion. 
It was held by this court in Beckstrom vs. Williams, 3 Utah 
2d 210, 282 P2d 309, that the plaintiff has a right to have 
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his theory of the case submitted to the jury if the evidence 
would justify reasonable men in following the theory, the 
court saying at page 212 of the Utah Report: 
"The jury having rejected plaintiff's complaint, on 
appeal we would ordinarily view the evidence in the 
ligh most favorable to the defendant. This is nort 
true, however, in this case where plaintiff's appeal 
challenges the trial court's refusal to submit plaintiff's 
theory of the case to the jury, as was his undoubted 
right if the evidence would justify reasonable men in 
following his theory.'' 
The court cited Morgan vs. Bingham Stage Line Com-
pany, 75 Utah 87, 283 P. 160. In that case the defendant 
challenged the trial court's ruling refusing to give reques-
ted instructions which presented defendant's theory of the 
case on the evidence. The Supreme Court held that this 
refusal to grant the requested instructions and to give de-
fendant's theory of the case to the jury was prejudicial 
error upcm which a new trial should be granted, and in so 
doing the court had the following to say: 
"A party is entitled to have his case submitted to 
the jury on the theory of his evidence as well as upon 
the theory of the whole evidence. Toone vs. O'Neill 
Const. Co., 40 Utah 265, 121 Pacific 10; Hartley vs. Salt 
Lake City, 41 Utah 121, 124 Pacific 522, 523, and Mil-
ler vs. Utah Consolidated M. Co., et al, 53 Utah 366, 
178 Pacific 771; Pratt vs. Utah Light and Traction Co., 
57 Utah 7, 169 Pacific 868." 
"'~he following language of Mr. Justice Straup in 
the case of Hartley vs. Salt Lake City, supra, is pe-
culiarly applicable here: 'There are two parties to a 
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law suit. Each, on a submission of the case to the 
jury, is entitled to a submission of it on his theory and 
the law in respect thereof. The defendant's theory 
as to the cause of the accident is embodied in the pro-
posed request. There is some evidence, as we have 
shown, to render them applicable to the case. That is 
not disputed. We think the oourt's refusal to charge 
substantially as requested was error. That the ruling 
was prejudicial and works a reversal of the judgment 
is self evident and unavoida!ble," 
In view of the pleadings and the evidence on the rec-
ord, reasonable men would be amply justified in following 
the plaintiff's theory of the case. It is the plaintiff's con-
tention that the court committed prejudicial error in re-
fusing to submit same to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
We sincerely believe that because the court (1) ad-
mitted in evidence the immaterial Plumbing Code, the ex-
pert testimony concerning same, and set out the bare code 
provisions without comment in Instruction No. 15, and (2) 
refused to submit plaintiff's theory of the case to the jury 
under the law and the great weight of the evidence, that 
prejudicial error was committed. We submit that plain-
tiff, who has been rendered a cripple for the rest of her 
life as a result of the extremely negligent conduct of de-
fendant, will suffer a grave injustice unless this Court or-
ders a new trial in this case. We earnestly urge, upon the 
grounds that the above mentioned errors of law commit-
ted by the court at the trial are prejudicial to the rights 
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of plaintiff, that the judgment on the verdict should be re-
versed and a new trial granted her. 
Respectfully submited, 
BALLIF & BALLIF 
GEORGE S. BALLIF 
GEORGE E. BALLIF 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
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